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Abstract
This article presents the method of steganography detection, which is formed by replacing
the least significant bit (LSB). Detection is performed by dividing the image into layers and
making an analysis of zero-layer of adjacent bits for every bit. First-layer and second-layer are
analyzed too. Hierarchies analysis method is used for making decision if current bit is changed.
Weighting coefficients as part of the analytic hierarchy process are formed on the values of bits.
Then a matrix of corrupted pixels is generated. Visualization of matrix with corrupted pixels
allows to determine size, location and presence of the embedded message. Computer exper-
iment was performed. Message was embedded in a bounded rectangular area of the image.
This method demonstrated efficiency even at low filling container, less than 10%. Widespread
statistical methods are unable to detect this steganographic insert. The location and size of
the embedded message can be determined with an error which is not exceeding to five pixels.
Keywords: steganography, steganalysis, LSB-method, algorithm for making decision, hierar-
chy analysis method.
1 Introduction
The simplest and most common method of embedding steganographic inserts is a substitution
of the least significant bits(LSB- substitution) [1]. The basic idea of the method is to replace
from one to four the least significant bits in bytes of image color representation pixels. The
least visible variant is the replacement of the blue component of the color, because that is
associated with the peculiarities of the human eye color perception. This method is used
both alone and as part of a more complex methods. Despite the simplicity of the algorithm
formation steganographic insert, the problem of detection without additional information is
quite complex. To date, there is no method that can determine with certainty the existence
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and the dimensions of the steganographic insert in any container. Most methods are statistical
in nature and are based on the assumption that the change in the statistical properties of the
image bits by placing it in the inserted information. Known to date methods are effective when
steganographic container is filled not less than 50% [2].
In [3] detection of stenographic insertion is performed on the assumption of change in
correlation between adjacent pixels. The proposed by the authors method is that nearest
neighbors of each pixel are considered. From the analysis of the surrounding pixels we can
make predictions about the value of the center pixel and compare with current value.
In [4] an algorithm for detecting steganographic inserts with using templates for surrounding
pixels. Template building is also based on the assumption of a strong correlation between pixels
of the original image. Correlations between pixels is also used in [5] to build the statistical
method for detecting steganographic inserts. A similar statistical method based on the the value
of correlation between adjacent pixels is proposed in [6]. In [?] there is a generalized method
for determining the length of the steganographic inserts by combining multiple detectors.
Using the autoregressive model for the detection of hidden messages, as well as an assessment
of their relative lengths is proposed in [7, 8].
Thus, the main steganalysis objectives today are the fundamental discovery of the presence
of a hidden insert and, if possible, the length determination of it. The purpose of this article is
a developing an algorithm for deciding whether a particular bit is spoofed. That is not simply
to determine the presence of steganographic insert, and, if possible, its definition.
2 Formulation of the problem
We will analyze the images, which can have embedded information in the form of steganography
inserts in the least significant bit of the blue component. In this case we start from the two
assumptions. First, we assume that we don’t know if there is any steganographic. Secondly, it
is not known in advance about number of embedded bits and their geometric position in the
image. The problem is posed to detect steganographic insert and determining the maximum
number of pixels, which have spoofed the LSB of the blue component. The second assumption
significantly complicates the task, because there can be a situation when pixels are replaced
in all zero-layer bits of blue components. In this case, analysis of the zero layer of image does
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not give any information. At the same time it is not known in advance whether to allow the
zero-layer analysis to make any conclusions. In this case the analysis requires higher layers.
We will rely on the assumption that basic regularities of the image gradually changes from
one layer to another. Therefore detected regularity in one layer must be repeated with high
probability in the surrounding layers.
We will find pixels with substitution in zero bits with separately analyzing zero layer and
next three layers. In the future, we will build a chart of the results of these two algorithms,
and adopting a general solution.
Let the k-th layer of the blue component of the original image is defined as a binary color
matrix B
(k)
ij , and the coordinates of the embedded information are set in the form of a matrix
Rij . In this case, Rij = 1, if there is a substitution LSB blue components of the corresponding
pixel and Rij = 0, if there is no substitution. As a result of embedding steganographic insert,
instead of the zero layer B
(0)
ij matrix will be formed A
(0)
ij . The problem is reduced to the most
accurate restoration of matrix Rij = 0 from analysis of the matrices A
(0)
ij , B
(1)
ij , B
(2)
ij , B
(3)
ij .
3 Application of the analytic hierarchy process to iden-
tify spoofed bits
Let’s apply the analytic hierarchy process [9] for a decision on the substitution of the bit. This
requires to formulate alternative solutions, from which selection is performed and also criteria
for analyzing alternatives. As mentioned in the statement of the problem it’s necessary to
identify the pixels with LSB substitution. Therefore only one of the possible two solutions
denoted hereafter or Y , if there is a substitution in LSB of given pixel, or N , if pixel was not
changed.
First, we construct a system to identify the substitution of bits based on the analysis of
the zero layer. For this we will perform sequential pass over all bits of zero layer and make an
analysis of the nearest neighbors of each of them. We distinguish three criteria:
K1 – adjacent bits on the sides have the same value as the analyzed or different from it.
K2 – the corners adjacent bits have the same value as the analyzed or different from it.
K3 – bit deviation from the average value of surrounding eight bits.
The first two criteria allow to detect extended regions of the same color on image. The third
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criterion is needed to identify areas with a gradient. Thus, we obtain a two-level hierarchical
tree of alternatives which is shown in Figure 1. The final decision is indicated by R.
Figure 1: Hierarchy of criteria to determine the substitution bit from zero layer analysis.
For the application of the analytic hierarchy process it is required to determine the relative
weights of the criteria ri (i = 1, 2, 3), and weight solutions within one criteria and weight
solutions within one criteria pi and qi (i = 1, 2, 3). We will assume that the criterion K1 is
more important than K2 in n times, and criterion K2 is more important than K3 in k times.
Also, we assume the presence of transitivity, this means that K1 is more important than K3 in
nk times. Then coherent matrix of pairwise comparisons will look like:
K1 K2 K3
K1 1 n kn
K2 1/n 1 k
K3 1/(kn) 1/k 1
From this matrix the weighting coefficients can be obtained with standard methods [9]:
r1 =
nk
nk + k + 1
, r2 =
k
nk + k + 1
, r3 =
1
nk + k + 1
.
With classical usage of the analytic hierarchy process pairwise comparisons are determined
on the basis of expert evaluations. In our approach, we use some objective indicators instead
of expert evaluations, which are determined by the number. In particular, constraints on the
values n and k we will determine from consideration trivial examples further. The most suitable
values of these parameters will be obtained from computer experiment.
Let’s turn to the definition of the weighting factors in each of the criteria. We begin with
K1. Let four bits of contacting with x have the same value, then the solution N has more
weight as compared with Y (namely analyzed bit is not spoofed) in x/(4 − x) times. Writing
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the matrix of pairwise comparisons and making the necessary changes, we are getting the values
of the coefficients p1 = (4 − x)/4, q1 = x/4. Similarly for the criterion K2. Let four bits in
contact with current bit only at the vertices have the same value. Then, the weight coefficients
will be changed to p2 = (4− y)/4, q2 = y/4.
For the calculation of weight coefficients according to the criterion let’t assume that value
of analyzed bit and the average value of the surrounding bits is c0. The following arguments
are used to find weight coefficients. Let the solution N has more weight than Y in a times,
where the value a depends on the absolute value of the deviation value of the bit, c depends
on the average values of surrounding bits c0 (dc = |c− c0|). Then, the weight coefficients will
have the form:
p3 =
1
a+ 1
, q3 =
a
a + 1
.
Lets consider extreme cases. If the current bit is equal to the average value of the surround-
ing bits (dc = 0) we will assume that this bit is not spoofed, the coefficients of this bit will have
this values p3 = 0, q3 = 1. If bit has maximum difference from the surrounding (dc = 1), then
we will think that it was spoofed, i.e p3 = 1, q3 = 0. Therefore, when dc = 0 there should be
a→∞. So, if dc = 1 then a = 0. These conditions are satisfied the following expression:
a =
1
dc
− 1.
Weighting coefficients will have the following values:
p3 = dc, q3 = 1− dc.
For a final decision it is necessary to calculate values:
P (Y ) = r1p1 + r2p2 + r3p3, P (N) = r1q1 + r2q2 + r3q3.
If P (Y ) > P (N), then we will make a decision that R = Y , this means that bit is spoofed,
otherwise, if P (Y ) ≤ P (N), then we will make a decision that R = N , this means that bit is
not spoofed.
We will extend the proposed method of bit analysis with a comparison of three overlying
layers. We will consider bits in each layer, which lies over the data and eight nearest adjacent
bits. In the future, this set of bits will be called as window in the corresponding layer. Let’s
introduce the criteria for making decision based on analysis of k-th layer (k = 1, 2, 3):
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K
(k)
1 – adjacent bits on both sides in the window of k-th layer have the same value as the
analyzed bits of zero-layer or different from it.
K
(k)
2 – the corners bits on both sides in the window of k-th layer have the same value as the
analyzed bits of zero-layer or different from it.
K
(k)
3 – deviation of bit in zero-layer from the average value of bits in window of k-th layer.
Three-level hierarchical tree of alternatives is shown in figure 2. The final decision is denoted
R1.
Figure 2: Hierarchy of criteria to determine bit substitution from analysis of overlying layers.
We will assume that the results of the analysis of the first layer is more important than the
results of the second twice, and the second layer is more important than the third twice too.
Hence, we obtain the values of the weighting coefficients:
t1 =
4
7
, t2 =
2
7
, t3 =
1
7
.
Within the framework of a single layer it is difficult to single out some of the criteria, so we
assume that they are all equal:
s1 = s2 = s3 =
1
3
.
For the weighting coefficients for two decisions under one criterion we apply an approach which
is similar to used in the zero layer analysis. For the first criterion:
p
(k)
1 =
4− x(k)
4
, q
(k)
1 =
x(k)
4
,
where x(k) is a number of neighbors on each side, with the same value in the window of k-layer.
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For the second criterion:
p
(k)
2 =
4− y(k)
4
, q
(k)
2 =
y(k)
4
,
where y(k) is a number of neighbors on the diagonal, with the same value in the window of
k-layer. The weighting coefficients of the third criterion:
p
(k)
3 = dc
(k), q
(k)
3 = 1− dc
(k),
where dc(k) – difference between the bit value from the average value of bits in the window of
k-layer.
For making decision it is necessary to calculate values:
P1(Y ) = t1
(
s1p
(1)
1 + s2p
(1)
2 + s3p
(1)
3
)
+ t2
(
s1p
(2)
1 + s2p
(2)
2 + s3p
(2)
3
)
+ t3
(
s1p
(3)
1 + s2p
(3)
2 + s3p
(3)
3
)
,
P1(N) = t1
(
s1q
(1)
1 + s2q
(1)
2 + s3q
(1)
3
)
+ t2
(
s1q
(2)
1 + s2q
(2)
2 + s3q
(2)
3
)
+ t3
(
s1q
(3)
1 + s2q
(3)
2 + s3q
(3)
3
)
.
If P1(Y ) > P1(N), then we make decision R1 = Y , i.e. bit is spoofed, otherwise, if P1(Y ) ≤
P1(N), then we make decision R1 = N , i.e. bit is not spoofed.
4 The algorithm to detect spoofed pixels
Let us write the algorithm formally that implements the proposed method. We perform a
consistent passage for all pixels in the image. For each pixel we will perform a series of steps:
Step 1. Select size of the window 3× 3 in the zero, first, second and third layers.
Step 2. Calculate values P (Y ), P (N), P1(Y ), P2(N).
Step 3. If at least one of the two equations is true R = Y or R1 = Y , that we assume that
the bit is spoofed. Then we will add this element to matrix Rij with value 1, otherwise value
is 0.
The output matrix Rij will have list of spoofed pixels. Since the algorithm is performed in a
single pass for all pixels and each pixel is performed for a fixed number of steps, then complexity
of the algorithm is linear. Also of note is the localization of the data which is needed for making
decision, in a small area around the current pixel, it’s easy to make a simple parallelization
algorithm with partitioning the image into regions.
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5 Computer experiment and results
Computer experiment was performed to research the effectiveness of the proposed method to
detect embedded information. The experiments were performed on three types of images:
gradient fill, artificial image of geometric shapes and widely used image ”Lena”. All images
had dimensions 640 × 480 pixels, the color depth is 256 colors. Embedded text in Russian in
the form of bit-sequences in a rectangular area located randomly in the center of the image.
There were 9% of changes in zero-layer of the original image. Figure 3 shows the results of the
experiment with the gradient fill.
Figure 3: Results of the algorithm to detect spoofed pixels on the gradient fill: a) original
image; b) matrix Rij for the original image; c) image with integrated text; d) matrix Rij for
the image with steganography insert.
As can be clearly seen from a comparison of figures 3a and 3b we can see visible rectangle,
which has embedding. Similar results for the artificial image with a geometric figures are shown
in Figure 4 for the photographic image results are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4: Results of the algorithm to detect spoofed pixels on the artificial image with a
geometric figures: a) image with integrated text; b) matrix Rij for the image with steganography
insert.
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Figure 5: Results of the algorithm to detect steganographic insert on the photographic image:
a) image with integrated text; b) matrix Rij for the image with steganography insert.
Both figures have clearly visible area, which was built by inserting hidden message.
6 Conclusion
Thus, the proposed algorithm in this article allows us not only to detect the presence of
steganography insertion into the image, but also it allows to determine with sufficient ac-
curacy location and volume of steganography insertion. Unlike presently common algorithms,
in this proposed method there was not any statistical approach. It should be noted that the
all used images images with steganographic insertions easily pass the Chi-square test which de-
tects embedded messages in them. This method requires further research for the development
of algorithms for the analysis of the resulting matrix Rij.
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